Risk behaviors of the MSM in Thai commercial sex market: Using insights from behavioral economics

Abstract

This paper looks at the behaviors of female sex workers (FSW), male sex workers (MSW), clients seeking female sex workers (CFSW) and clients seeking male sex workers (CMSW) in the Thai commercial sex market under the conditions of imperfect information. We designed an experimental game model in which both the sex worker and their client do not know the health status of potential partners. The objectives of our model are to find the probabilities of all possible outcomes and to examine behavioral bias. The Nash equilibrium solution informs us that safe sex or sex with condoms is the rational strategy for those who are free from sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and for those who are risk averse, while sex without a condom is still possible for those who are infected and/or are risk lovers. In particular, we look at the possibility of behavioral bias when a client may offer significantly higher incentives for unprotected sex or sex without a condom usually in the form of a monetary offer or tip. The paper finds that the group of males who have sex with males (MSM), both clients and sex workers, are most likely to take risks. More specifically, in our experiment involving 200 sex workers and 67 clients, none of the CFSW show any willingness to negotiate for sex without condom, while 13.88% of the CMSW are still willing to negotiate for sex without condoms. Regarding the sex workers, there is a small probability that FSW may accept unprotected sex when offered a tip of Baht 5,000 or above, while more than 30% of the MSW report that they would accept unprotected sex when offered Baht 5,000 or more. Overall, this paper suggests that MSM, both clients (CMSW) and sex workers (MSW), may take greater risk by engaging in unprotected sex.